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Abstract Woodward’s interventionist theory of causation is beset by a problem of
circularity: the analysis of causes is in terms of interventions, and the analysis of inter-
ventions is in terms of causes. This is not in itself an argument against the correctness
of the analysis. But by requiring us to have causal knowledge prior to making any
judgements about causation, Woodward’s theory does make it mysterious how we
can ever start acquiring causal knowledge. We present a solution to this problem by
showing how the interventionist notion of causation can be rationally generated from
a more primitive agency notion of causation. The agency notion is easily and non-
circularly applicable, but fails when we attempt to capture causal relations between
non-actions. We show that the interventionist notion of causation serves as an appro-
priate generalisation of the agency notion. Furthermore, the causal judgements based
on the latter generally remain true when rephrased in terms of the former, which allows
one to use the causal knowledge gained by applying the agency notion as a basis for
applying Woodward’s interventionist theory. We then present an overview of relevant
empirical evidence from developmental psychology which shows that our proposed
rational reconstruction lines up neatly with the actual development of causal reasoning
in children. This gives additional plausibility to our proposal. The article thus provides
a solution to one of the main problems of interventionism while keeping Woodward’s
analysis intact.
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1 Introduction
The analysis of causation has been an important and controversial topic in the philos-
ophy of science for many decades (see, for instance, Sosa and Tooley 1993; Psillos
2002; Beebee et al. 2009). An approach that has achieved wide popularity recently
is James Woodward’s interventionism (Woodward 2003a). The main idea of Wood-
ward’s theory is that causation should be analysed in terms of intervention: roughly,
X causes Y if and only if there is a possible intervention I on X that changes the value
of Y . Much of the theory’s work is done by conditions which spell out exactly which
interactions count as interventions.
If one looks at the intuitions underlying the theory, interventionism is closely related
to earlier agency theories of causation (e. g., Collingwood 1940; Von Wright 1971;
Menzies and Price 1993), which analysed causation in terms of human action. How-
ever, interventionism distinguishes itself from these theories by avoiding the concept
of agency. This makes it immune to what has generally been seen as the main prob-
lem faced by agency theories, namely, that it is not clear how a theory that analyses
causation in terms of agency can handle causal relations between events that humans
could not possibly cause, such as earthquakes or, even more radically, the Big Bang
(Menzies and Price 1993, Sect. 5; Woodward 2003b, pp. 123–127; 2008a, Sect. 3).
Unsurprisingly, Woodward’s analysis of causation has some problems of its own. To
our mind, the most fundamental criticism that has been levelled against it is that there
is an infinite regress in the interventionist definition of cause: Woodward’s definition
of cause contains the term intervention, while his definition of intervention contains
the term cause. Woodward recognises this circularity and argues that it is not vicious.
However, several writers point out that even if it is not vicious in certain respects,
it nevertheless raises tough problems for his theory (Glymour 2004; de Regt 2004;
Baumgartner 2009).
In this article, we first wish to argue that the circularity in the interventionist theory
is indeed problematic, but that it is not a problem of analysis, but a problem of genesis.
That is, we will argue that although Woodward can hold that his theory captures the
meaning of causation, the theory nevertheless makes it highly mysterious how we
could ever acquire such a concept and start gathering causal knowledge. Since we
appear to have causal knowledge, this is problematic. The existence of such a mystery
casts doubt upon the analysis itself, especially since other theories of causation—for
instance, theories that are based on observed correlations—do not have a problem of
genesis.
The main aim of our article is to demonstrate that the problem of genesis can be
solved within the framework of interventionism by assuming that our interventionist
notion of causation develops from an agency notion of causation. We provide a rational
reconstruction of this development. Furthermore, we show that, from an empirical
point of view, it is plausible that something like our reconstruction takes place during
the early life of every human being.
Defenders of interventionism can adopt this solution to the problem of circularity
without having to change their analysis of causation. We claim that agency plays an
important role in the development of the concept of causation, but that it has been
superseded and generalised away in the concept of causation as we currently have
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it. Our own actual sympathies for agency theories run deeper than that, but we will
not press them in this article. Here, we present ourselves as Woodwardians using the
notion of agency to solve a difficulty of the interventionist theory.
The argument is divided into three parts. In Sect. 2 we discuss the problem of circu-
larity in Woodward’s theory, and conclude that the real problem facing interventionism
is a problem of genesis. At the same time, we develop a rough idea of how this problem
can be solved without changing the interventionist analysis of causation itself. We then
give a rational reconstruction of the genesis of the interventionist notion of causation
from a simple agency theory in Sect. 3. Finally, in Sect. 4 we give an overview of the
empirical evidence for this proposed story of genesis. All in all, we present what we
believe to be a philosophically pleasing and empirically plausible solution to the main
problem besetting Woodward’s interventionism.
2 The problem of circularity
According to Woodward, “X is a contributing cause to Y with respect to variable set
V” means (roughly) that there is a possible intervention on X with respect to Y that
changes the value of Y while certain other variables are held fixed (Woodward 2003a,
p. 59). Interventions are defined in terms of intervention variables; and a necessary
condition for I being an intervention variable for X with respect to Y is that I is a
contributing cause of X (Woodward 2003b, p. 98). I is a contributing cause to X just
in case there is some variable set V such that I is a contributing cause to X with respect
to V (Woodward 2008b, p. 209). Thus, we have a circle of definitions moving from
“contributing cause with respect to a variable set”, to “intervention”, to “intervention
variable”, to “contributing cause” to “contributing cause with respect to a variable
set”. Is this a problem, and if so, what kind of problem is it?
Here is one possible line of argument. The main philosophical problem with causa-
tion is the fact that it is or seems to be a modal notion, and modality is mysterious. So
what we are looking for when we analyse causation is a reductive analysis in non-modal
terms. Potential candidates are Humean and Mill–Ramsey–Lewis-style theories; but
interventionism evidently fails to deliver the goods, because its circularity ensures that
the modal notions are not analysed away. We thus have a failure of reduction.
While adherents of certain forms of positivism and empiricism may find this line of
argument persuasive, it is clear that an interventionist need not be too worried about
it. Woodward specifically states (2003b, p. 106) that he does not believe a reductive
theory of causation to be possible, and cites the long history of failures of Humean
and correlation-based theories as a reason for this belief. His theory is supposed to
show us how different causal concepts hang together and how different causal claims
are related; it is not supposed to show us how causation can be reduced to non-modal
concepts (as the use of counterfactual conditions involving “possible” interventions
already shows). Conceived in this way, then, the problem of circularity is simply
irrelevant to interventionism; those who invoke it would be begging the question.
Here is another line of argument. A theory of causation should tell us what “X causes
Y ” means. It evidently cannot do this by simply repeating the phrase and stating that
“X causes Y just in case X causes Y ”. But even if the analysis is more enlightening
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than that, and does for instance start out by telling us that X causes Y if and only if
there is a possible intervention I on X that changes Y , it would still be disappointing
if it turns out that part of the analysis of “there is an intervention I on X that changes
Y ” is “X causes Y ”. Such a theory would suffer from a circular regress. It would
not necessarily be worthless, as it would show us how the concepts of cause and of
intervention hang together; but it could hardly be thought to be a satisfying analysis
of the meaning of causal claims. It would also be epistemologically troubling, for we
would seem to need to know whether or not X causes Y before we could know whether
X causes Y .
Woodward recognises this problem, but is quick to point out that his theory does not
suffer from such a circular regress (2003b, p. 105). Part of the analysis of “X causes
Y ” is that there is a possible intervention I on X with respect to Y that changes the
value of Y ; and part of the analysis of that claim is that “I causes X”. Since the latter
causal claim is not identical to the former, there is no circular regress. Speaking in
terms of knowledge, although we need some causal knowledge before we can come
to know a new causal fact, we do not need to know that very fact itself prior to coming
to know it.
But this suggests a third line of argument. According to interventionism, it is part
of the meaning of “X causes Y ” that there is some possible I such that (among
other things) I causes X . But part of the meaning of that latter claim is that there is
some possible J such that (among other things) J causes I . And so on, ad infinitum,
unless at some point we enter a circle. So supposing that Woodward is right and there
is no circular regress in his theory, there is nevertheless an infinite regress. Is this
problematic?
Woodward does not think it is. According to him, the infinite regress simply means
that causation cannot be defined in non-causal terms, which is not a problem since he
does not want to give a reductive analysis of causation anyway. The infinite regress also
means that we cannot get causal knowledge and cannot perform causal tests without
having some previous causal knowledge. But this too is a consequence that Woodward
simply accepts: all methods of causal reasoning and testing either require prior causal
knowledge or stipulate causal assumptions. No causes in, no causes out, is the slogan
(as Cartwright formulated it in her 1994); and if that slogan holds true for all methods
of causal reasoning, then interventionism is no worse off than any of its competitors.
These arguments have not been accepted by all commentators. For instance, Gly-
mour and De Regt insist that the infinite regress still engenders what we will call
a problem of analysis; that is, the infinite regress shows that interventionism cannot
adequately capture the meaning of the term causation. De Regt (2004) writes:
MT [Woodward’s theory about the meaning of causal claims] does not reduce
causation to other concepts, because causal relations are defined via the notion
of intervention, which is itself a causal notion. Woodward argues that this cir-
cularity is not vicious because the causal information required to characterize
the intervention is independent of the alleged causal relation between X and Y...
However, this argument holds water only if MT is regarded as a theory of causal
inference or testing. If MT is a theory of the meaning of causal claims, then it is
hard to see how the circularity cannot be vicious.
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Glymour (2004) makes essentially the same point:
Ok, the definition is ill-founded, not circular: it could never be applied to deter-
mine direct causes ab initio. It could tell us something fundamental about how
our notions of cause and intervention are often related, but it cannot be an analy-
sis of the very meanings – whatever those are – of ‘intervention’ and ‘direct
cause’. (p. 785)
De Regt and Glymour both claim that an analysis of causation which leads to an
infinite regress cannot be a satisfactory analysis of the meaning of the term, because
such a definition is in some sense viciously circular and cannot determine causes
ab initio. It is easy to understand the underlying intuition here. Suppose we analyse
the notion of a natural number in the following way: “if n is a natural number, then
the successor of n is also a natural number”. This analysis is incomplete. It will not
allow us to determine whether something is a natural number until we add a way of
getting the iterative process going, for example, by adding that “0 is a natural number”.
Woodward has given us an analysis of the form “if m is a cause of n, and X(m, n, o),
then n is a cause of o”. This seems to be incomplete unless we are given a way to start
the iterative process.
The analogy with natural numbers is suggestive. But are regressing analyses neces-
sarily incomplete? Let us consider, as something of a toy example, the idea that we can
analyse “law” (in the legal sense) as “a rule stipulated to be a law by the legislature”.
Furthermore, we define the legislature as “the body of people who have lawfully been
given the authority to make laws”, and we define that authority is lawfully given just
in case it is “given in accordance to the laws”.
There is an obvious circle here: the legislature decides which rules are laws, and
the laws designate which people are the legislature. Our analysis cannot be used to
decide which things are laws ab initio. Does this mean that the analysis is incomplete,
and that we must add a rule saying which were the first laws or what was the first
legislature?
Perhaps we do. But it certainly seems possible to hold that our analysis exhausts the
concept of law. It is neither inconsistent nor incoherent to claim that the first legislature
turned itself into that first legislature by passing the first law. If there is a difficulty with
such a proposal, it is not that it is absurd, but that it leaves open the question of how
we can know that something is a law or a legislature. It seems that we must already
know that some things are laws or legislatures before we can decide of anything else
that it is a law or a legislature.
Does such an epistemic problem prove that our analysis of the meaning of law is
wrong? Only if we assume that an analysis of the meaning of a term consists in giving
a method to decide whether an object falls under that term or not. Such an assumption
seems dangerously close to a verification theory of meaning, and Woodward is under
no obligation to accept it. The interventionist, then, can flat out deny that the circularity
in Woodward’s definition leads to a problem of analysis.
But perhaps the problem of circularity should not be formulated in terms of mean-
ing. Baumgartner (2009) claims that the infinite regress in interventionism leads to a
problem with testing causal claims, since you always need prior causal knowledge to
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perform a test. If so, how could such testing ever get started? For Baumgartner, the
problem with interventionism’s circularity is not primarily a problem of analysis; it
is a problem of genesis (this is our term, not his). Given interventionism, it is unclear
how we could ever get any causal knowledge, how our causal discourse could ever get
started. It appears that we always already need to have some causal knowledge before
we could gain any.
Baumgartner describes two strategies which Woodward could use to solve this
problem. The first is to claim that we do have prior causal knowledge; the second
is to simply stipulate some variables as causes of (or intervention variables for) oth-
ers. Both strategies, Baumgartner argues, are problematic. The latter, where we sim-
ply stipulate that a certain set of causal claims is true, works well if you are only
interested in the validity of causal inferences, but using it means giving up all hope
of showing which causal inferences are sound (i.e., not only valid but also true).
An interventionist who would be content with having a theory of causal inference
could adopt this strategy, but an interventionist who wants to be able to explain
how we can get any true (or even simply justified) causal beliefs in the first place
cannot.
So if Woodward wants to stop the infinite regress of testing, and explain how
causal discourse can get started, he must claim that we can have causal knowl-
edge prior to applying the interventionist criterion. It is possible to have prior causal
knowledge, Baumgartner continues, if we have some suitable, independent heuris-
tic that allows us to decide for some A and B that A causes B. There should, in
other words, be some property of pairs A and B that, while not being a part of
the interventionist analysis of causation, nevertheless is strongly correlated with A
causing B. We could, for instance, adopt the heuristic “you are justified in con-
cluding that A causes B if B happened near and shortly after A”, and then use the
beliefs gained this way as a basis for applying the interventionist theory. (Of course,
this particular example does not work, since it leads to wrong conclusions far too
often.)
Baumgartner allows that there might be a good heuristic to be found. But he casts
doubt on the idea that a non-interventionist condition could be interpreted as merely a
heuristic.
[I]n order to establish a certain non-definitional property of an entity of type t as a
heuristic measure for the identification of entities of type t , it must be shown that
the non-definitional property indeed coincides with the definitional properties
of entities of type t . That is only possible if at least some entities of type t can
actually be identified explicitly by applying t’s definition. That is, heuristics for
t can only be validated if the definition of entities of type t is applicable in a
finite number of steps, at least in principle. (p. 186; emphasis in the original.)
But the regress problem arises precisely because this last condition is not met by
Woodward’s analysis. Thus, Baumgartner concludes:
In view of this lack of a single positive application of [Woodward’s analysis],
non-interventionist accounts cannot be given the status of heuristics for assessing
the satisfaction of [Woodward’s analysis]. Instead, they provide self-contained
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analyses of causation that are independent of the notion of intervention. (p. 186;
emphasis in the original.)
Baumgartner’s point is that because Woodward’s theory cannot be applied in a
finite number of steps to even one single variable set, an interventionist can never
check whether the claims of any other account of causation coincide with the claims
of the interventionist theory. This means that the interventionist cannot justify using
any particular account of causation as a heuristic, except by accepting it as a self-
contained, independent analysis of causation.
But if one does so, what purpose is the interventionist theory supposed to serve?
Well, it might be the case that the non-interventionist account of causation, while inde-
pendent of interventionism, is to some extent unsatisfactory, and that interventionism
is introduced to eliminate these deficiencies. The body of causal claims generated
by the original account could then be used as the basis of the interventionist theory,
although it would be a basis that had to be extended and/or corrected by intervenionism.
For instance, suppose that we start out with some probabilistic account of causation.
It might turn out that the causal claims we accept based on that theory can be more
usefully generalised and systematised if we use an interventionist theory. By using the
results of the probabilistic account as at least prima facie justified, it might be possible
to bootstrap ourselves from the probabilistic account to the interventionist one. In this
case, the probabilistic account does not function as a heuristic for the interventionist
theory, but as a (temporal and, more importantly, methodological) precursor to that
theory.
However, if the only way to get started with the interventionist theory of causa-
tion is to first accept a theory of causation that is conceptually wholly independent of
the interventionist theory, causation becomes a mysteriously dual notion. If we need
to start our causal discourse by understanding causation in terms of probabilities,
it would then be puzzling if causation turned out to be an irreducibly intervention-
ist notion. This mysterious duality can only be avoided if the original theory is not
just a methodological but also a conceptual precursor of interventionism; that is, if
we can understand interventionism as a development and refinement of the original
theory.
These points are crucial to an understanding of our project, so let us phrase them
once again in a slightly different way. Baumgartner claims (correctly, in our view) that
the only way to validate A as a heuristic for B is by comparing decisions based on
A and decisions based on B, and seeing that they coincide. But if we have developed
B as a theory that allows us to generalise and gain better understanding of the results
first gained by applying A, there is no need to validate A as a heuristic of B. Rather,
B has to be validated as a better, more useful analysis of the notion that was first
introduced by A. The genesis of the interventionist notion of causation can then be
thought of in the following way. First, we start out with a simple, easily applicable
notion of causation, A. With A in hand, we start gathering causal knowledge. But for
one reason or another—which would of course have to be spelled out—A turns out to
be unsatisfactory. We recognise that we could adopt a causal notion B that allows us to
keep almost all our previous causal knowledge and to extend it in useful ways, while
the conceptual continuity between A and B still allows us to think of B as a theory of
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causation. We thus come to adopt B, using our previous causal knowledge—perhaps
with some objectionable elements purged from it—as an inference basis for future
causal testing.1
In the rest of this paper, we wish to defend the view that this scenario comes close
to what actually happens. The interventionist notion of causation can be understood
as a sophisticated version of a primitive agency notion of causation, a version we have
arrived at after generalising away from human action. The interventionist theory can
escape the infinite regress of testing because it can treat the original causal claims of the
agency theory as prima facie justified claims about contributing causation simpliciter—
they may turn out to be wrong on occasion, but they are in fact (that is, contingently)
mostly right. The relation between interventionism and agency is not necessary, but
turns out to be strong enough in our actual world to allow for bootstrapping from the
latter to the former. In the next section, we will show how this bootstrapping takes place.
3 From agency to intervention
How can an interventionist notion of causation be generated from an agency notion of
causation? In the current section, we will give a rational reconstruction of this process,
presenting first a rough outline and then describing the individual steps in more detail.
For the sake of brevity, we will abbreviate the agency notion of causation as causation1,
and the interventionist notion as causation2. Causation2 is Woodward’s notion of a
contributing cause simpliciter (that is, not relativised to any variable set).
Our rational reconstruction consists of the defence of three claims:
(1) A simple agency theory can be applied ab initio to gain justified causal1 beliefs.
(That is: the concept causation1 can be applied without presupposing prior causal
knowledge. If that were not the case, we would just have replaced one problem of
genesis with another.)
(2) Causation1 is an unsatisfying concept, because there are some obvious and useful
ways to generalise our causal1 knowledge that are impossible to capture in terms
of agency. Causation2 can be understood as a generalisation of causation1 that
disposes with the concept of agency.
(3) Most claims that are true when formulated in terms of causation1 can be and are
in fact held true when formulated in terms of causation2.
Claim 3 needs a little more explication. We have seen that the interventionist theory,
which defines causation2, can only be applied if we start with a prior body of causal
knowledge that can then be extended and perhaps partly revised. In our reconstruction
of the genesis of causation2, this body of knowledge is the body of causal1 knowledge.
If this reconstruction is correct, two things follow. First, the body of causal1 knowledge
must fit (with at most minor exceptions) into the formal structure of Woodward’s
1 Throughout this paper, we will assume that analyses of the concept of causation can be ranked as better
and worse on pragmatic grounds, without the need for a theory-neutral set of intuitions underlying them.
We also assume that it is possible to see intellectual progress from a worse to a better theory from a purely
internal perspective, without the need for a further point of view that is neutral with respect to the two
theories. A defence of these assumptions falls outside the scope of the current paper.
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theory. While this theory underdetermines for each particular causal claim whether
it is true or false, it does determine for some sets of causal claims that not all of
its members can be true; or that if all of its members are true, some other particular
causal statement must also be true. A body of purported causal knowledge may or may
not fit these constraints. Claim 3 states that the body of causal1 knowledge does fit
interventionism’s constraints; that is, most causal1 knowledge can be held true when
formulated in terms of causation2.
Second, claim 3 also states that most of this body is in fact held true. That is, most
of the claims made by the agency theory are causal claims that we actually accept (and
that the interventionist thus wishes to capture with the notion of causation2). If this
were not the case, we apparently did not use causation1 as a basis for the concept of
causation that interventionism is meant to explicate.
According to our reconstruction, then, there are two kinds of continuity between
causation1 and causation2. First, there is a conceptual continuity: the interventionist
theory can be seen as a rational development of the agency theory. Second, there is an
extensional continuity: most claims that come out true under the agency theory can also
be held true by those who use an interventionist theory, and are in fact held true by us. As
explained in Sect. 2, the first kind of continuity is needed to circumvent Baumgartner’s
criticism by establishing that the agency theory is not a heuristic for, but a conceptual
precursor of the interventionist theory. The second kind of continuity, meanwhile, is
needed to establish that the agency theory can function as a methodological precursor
to the interventionist theory.
Our reconstruction will of course be sketchy. It is unlikely that the actual devel-
opment of our notion of causation can be neatly divided into an agency stage and an
interventionist stage, or proceeds based on the rational arguments that we will present.
Also, we will not claim that Woodward’s interventionism is the only possible devel-
opment of an agency theory, or that the agency theory is the only possible precursor
for interventionism. Rather, the aim of the reconstruction is to show that it is possible,
in spite of the theory’s circularity, to have justified causal2 beliefs. In Sect. 4 we will
say more about how the development of our causal notions actually takes place, and
we will see that it roughly lines up with our proposed reconstruction.
Let us start by giving a more precise definition of causation1. A simple version of
the agency theory of causation can be found in the work of Von Wright:
p is a cause relative to q, and q an effect relative to p, if and only if by doing
p we could bring about q or by suppressing p we could remove q or prevent it
from happening. (Von Wright 1971, p. 70)
In our discussion, we will assume that the variables (which we will call X and Y for
consistency with Woodward’s use) stand for type-level events, except where context
makes it clear that we speak of particular instantiations of those types. Moreover, the
first type-level event (the cause) is always a type of action. This makes the theory quite
restricted in scope: it does not make claims about causal relations between non-actions.
We will understand type-level causal claims as statistical claims in the sense that
they do not have to be exceptionless. Finally, we will assume that “doing” (or “taking
an action”) is a primitive notion. In particular, that “S does X” is not to be interpreted
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as the claim that there is a causal connection between two events, say a mental state
of S and an event X . It is also not to be understood as the claim that S “intervenes on”
X in the Woodwardian sense.
It is easy to see why this notion of causation1 would be useful to agents. We desire
certain events to happen or not to happen. If we can perform some action X that
makes it likelier that a desirable event Y happens, we would like to know about this
connection. And if action X would prevent an undesirable event Y , that too would be
good to know. In fact, it is hard to think of a concept that is more useful for agents to
have than causation1.
Let us move on to the defense of the first claim. Is it true that the simple agency
theory can be applied ab initio to gain justified causal1 beliefs?
One worry can be put aside easily, namely the worry that “bring about” and “pre-
vent” are causal notions, and that Von Wright’s definition is therefore circular. We
already pointed out that we use these terms as primitives, not as notions that are some-
how defined in terms of causation. Furthermore, we already saw, in Sect. 2, that the
aim of our theory is not the reduction of a modal notion of causation to non-modal
notions, so the appearance of modal concepts in Von Wright’s definition of causation
cannot count against it.
But this is merely a negative point. In order to defend our first claim, we must
provide an epistemic procedure that allows us to gain justified beliefs about causal1
claims. The agent begins by noticing a correlation between the action X and the event
Y : when the agent does X, Y tends to happen more often than when the agent does
not do X . When I clap my hands, I tend to hear a loud noise. When I kick a tree full
of apples, apples tend to fall out. When I yawn, the sun tends to set.
Such a correlation of course does not prove that I can bring about Y by doing X .
But there are easy ways to test this hypothesis. I can do X in circumstances in which
I otherwise would not do X , and see if this does or does not break the correlation
with Y . I can refrain from doing X in circumstances in which I normally do it, and
see whether Y still happens. Normally, I kick trees only in the morning, when I am
hungry. This time, I decide to kick trees at random throughout the day, and it turns out
that apples still fall out whenever I kick. Normally, I start yawning when I have been
awake for many hours; this time I refrain from yawning, but the sun still sets. These
tests give me some justification for believing that by kicking, I bring about the falling
of fruit; and that by yawning, I do not bring about the setting of the sun.
Why are we allowed to speak of justification? If there is a causal1 relation between
X and Y , then I expect the correlation between the two variables to remain when I
change my X -behaviour; for such a correlation is implied by the claim that doing X
brings about Y . On the other hand, if there is no causal1 relation between X and Y , we
do not expect the correlation to remain under variations of my X -behaviour. (Though
it would perhaps be too strong to claim that we expect the correlation to disappear.) So
if I do change my X -behaviour and the correlation remains, this raises the Bayesian
probability of there being a causal1 relation between X and Y .2
2 We are not committing ourselves to Bayesianism here: other theories of confirmation would yield the
same verdict.
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Can we really expect people who do not even have the concept of causation to engage
in such testing procedures? Perhaps not consciously, not if that implies that they have
a theory of testing and justification. But something like the procedure described is
what happens naturally to a reasoning agent whose whims and sudden inclinations
ensure that his pattern of actions is not rigid. The procedure we have suggested is
therefore not psychologically implausible. (See also Woodward 2007, and Sect. 4 of
this article.)
Agents can thus gain a body of justified causal1 beliefs. But why would they bother
to develop their notion of causation towards the interventionist idea of causation2?
And are most of the justified causal1 beliefs also held to be true causal2 beliefs, which
is necessary for our bootstrap procedure to work?
Extending the notion of causation1 to encompass non-actions as causes will be very
useful, since complex causal reasoning about actions requires such an extension. As a
simple example, we would like to be able to reason as follows: action X causes1 non-
action event Y ; Y causes1 non-action event Z ; so X causes1 Z , that is, by performing
X I can make Z happen. But this kind of reasoning is impossible on the agency theory
(as we have presented it), because only actions can appear on the left hand side of
causation1. This is a serious limitation of the agency theory.
Knowledge about the causal1 relations between actions and events can therefore
be systematised and made more efficient when the notion of causation is extended
to relations between non-action events.3 A generalising move away from agency is
therefore to be expected. But why would this move be towards an interventionist
concept of causation?
Before we answer that question, it is useful to look at the truth of the justified
causation1 beliefs when they are transposed to an interventionist causation2 vocabu-
lary. The epistemic procedure we described for forming justified causal1 beliefs was
based on two things: correlations and non-rigid patterns of behaviour. Why would
this procedure uncover what we see as true causal2 knowledge, rather than falling
into the pitfalls of spurious correlation that appear whenever we have common cause
structures?
The answer is that in fact (contingently) our actions, and especially the more exper-
imental ones that break with ingrained patterns of behaviour, are almost never related
to their seeming results through a common cause structure. It is almost never the case
that a class of events A causes both my action X and its seeming result Y . Not because
such cases are impossible; they are in fact possible. As an example, assume that there
is a correlation between a state B of your brain and you raising your hand five sec-
onds later; and assume furthermore that B causes a beep to be heard six seconds later
through some causal path that does not go through the raising of your hand.Such a
scenario could be made reality by a neuroscientist who continually measures whether
B is actualised. In this case, you will come to the erroneous conclusion that raising
your hand causes1 the beep. But such scenarios are not common. Our brain states
3 From an anthropological perspective, one can speculate that animism—the ascription of personhood to
natural objects—is the temporary result of such a development, where causation has been placed outside
of human actions, but has not yet lost its connection to action completely. We are not competent to develop
this suggestion.
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tend to have few noticeable effects except through our actions, and the correlations
between prior events outside of our brain and our actions, while they do exist, tend to
disappear when we decide to break our regular patterns of behaviour.
For example, the rising of the sun may cause me to get out of my bed, and it may
cause the singing of the birds. This is a common cause structure that could lead me
astray and make me conclude that my rising causes the birds to sing. But as soon as
I try, whenever the whim takes me, to make the birds sing by getting out of bed, the
correlation disappears. And this happens to be the case for almost every common cause
structure involving actions that is instantiated in our universe. Our justified beliefs
about causal1 relations will therefore almost always be held to be true causal2 claims
as well, and this ensures that they can be used as the basis of a bootstrapping procedure.
We now return to the question of why a generalisation of causation1 to non-action
causes would go towards an interventionist notion. A naïve generalisation, which
drops the action requirement and just looks at correlations, will have a problem with
common cause structures: as is well known, correlations between X and Y do not
prove that X causes Y . Since common cause structures, which happen to be almost
always absent between actions and their seeming results, are common in the rest of
nature, this is a major problem.
To solve this problem, we need to require that there exists a variable I which can
change some non-action variable X independently of other variables in the environ-
ment. We then observe whether such ‘action-like’ changes of X correlate with changes
in Y , and if they do, we conclude that X causes2 Y . To make sure that we do not fall prey
to common cause structures and other potential problems, we need to exclude several
possibilities: e.g., I influencing Y through a causal2 path that does not go through
X , or I being correlated with a variable Z that influences Y through a causal2 path
that does not go through X . Such possibilities are exactly what Woodward attempts
to exclude with his idea of intervention variables (Woodward 2003a, p. 98).
We know from our previous discussions that to know that a given variable is a
Woodwardian intervention variable, we need to use prior causal2 knowledge. If we start
with an agency theory, we have prior causal1 knowledge. Transposing that knowledge
to the new theory of causation2, we have a basis from which we can develop further
causal2 knowledge of the world. This is possible because our causal1 knowledge is
almost entirely free of common cause structures. It is plausible because the notion of
causation2 can be seen as a more sophisticated development of the notion of causation1.
We have bootstrapped ourselves out of the swamp of agency into the impersonal realm
of interventionism.
In this section, then, we have seen why agents might develop the notion of
causation1; how they can get justified beliefs about causal1 relations; why causation1
must be generalised to non-actions; why the problems with such a generalisation will
lead towards a Woodwardian notion of causation2; and that our world is in fact such
that if we turn our causal1 beliefs into causal2 beliefs, most of them can be held true,
which proves that they can function as a bootstrapping basis. This amounts to a ratio-
nal reconstruction of the genesis of our causal2 knowledge, and therefore solves the
problem of genesis that besets Woodward’s theory. To seal the deal, so to speak, we
will now argue that this story of genesis lines up well with our empirical knowledge
of the development of the concept of causation.
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4 Agency and interventionism from an empirical perspective
In the previous sections we argued that the problem of circularity for Woodward’s
interventionism can be solved if we assume that the interventionist notion of causation
can be understood as a sophisticated version of an agency notion. More in particular,
we claimed that the relation between interventionism and agency is strong enough to
enable a bootstrap procedure from the latter to the former. In this section we show
how such a bootstrap procedure can be explicated in empirical terms by distinguishing
between four stages of development:
(i) perceiving correlations between non-action events (i.e., perceiving temporal and
spatial contiguity);
(ii) understanding causal1 relations between one’s own actions and their effects;
(iii) understanding causal1 relations between another agent’s actions and their effects;
(iv) understanding causal2 relations between non-action events.
Before spelling out these different stages in more detail, we would like to stress that
we do not attempt to provide a full-fledged ontogenetic model of the interventionist
notion of causation we have presented so far. Our aim is much more modest; it is
to establish that, if one considers the development of causal understanding from a
naturalistic perspective, there are interesting facts that should encourage us to take
this notion seriously. Furthermore, we do not want to suggest that this development
can be neatly divided in four stages, each with a precise onset time. Although we will
provide an indication of the onset of each stage, based on what is currently known
about the development of causal understanding, this is of course constrained by various
experimental limitations and subject to further empirical testing.
Empirical research on causal understanding in early infancy has primarily focused
on the capacity to perceive temporal and spatial contiguity between events—what
Leslie (1995) referred to as ‘mechanical causality’. This Humean notion of causality
has been tested by means of ‘direct launching’ experiments (Michotte 1963), in which
subjects are presented with a stimulus X that moves across the screen and makes
contact with a second stimulus Y that then begins to move. Subjects perceive this
event as ‘causal’, but they fail to do so if (1) a temporal delay is inserted from the
time the stimuli make contact until the second stimulus begins to move, or (2) a
spatial distance is created between the two stimuli. Leslie and Keeble (1987) used this
paradigm to show that the ability to perceive causal relations in terms of temporal and
spatial contiguity is already present in 6-month-olds (see also Schlottmann and Surian
1999 for similar findings in 9-month-olds).
The capacity to perceive temporal and spatial contiguity between events provides
agents with a basic understanding of predictive relations, e.g. that stimulus X predicts
stimulus Y. This understanding is still limited and not genuinely causal; insofar as the
predictive relations hold for events that are outside of the agent’s control, there is no
way in which the agent can know whether stimulus X actually causes stimulus Y.
Things are different, however, when we consider the relations between the agent’s
own actions and their effects. As we argued in Sect. 3, the agent can easily test whether
her action X is the cause of effect Y by doing X in circumstances in which she
otherwise would not do X, and see if this does or does not break the correlation with Y
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(or refrain from doing X, and see whether Y still happens). The only requirement for
such a testing procedure is voluntary action control. We can use Elsner and Hommel’s
(2001) two-stage model of voluntary action control to explain how agents acquire an
understanding of causal1 relations between their own actions and their effects (see
also Hommel and Elsner 2009). Suppose an agent performs a particular action X that
leads to a particular effect Y . According to Elsner and Hommel’s model, the motor and
perceptual representations underlying respectively the action X and the perception of
effect Y are integrated in such a way that activating the perceptual representation of
effect Y on a later occasion also activates the motor representation of action X. In this
way, the agent learns that action X has to be performed in order to bring about effect
Y.4 Empirical studies indicate that this primitive agency notion of causation emerges
around 9 months of age (e.g., Verschoor et al. 2010).
The agent’s understanding of causal1 relations between her own actions and their
effects is intimately intertwined with her understanding of causal1 relations between
another agent’s actions and their effects. For example, Sommerville et al. (2008) have
shown that 10-month-old infants who received active training in pulling a cane to
retrieve a toy learned about the causal relation between another agent’s cane-pulling
action and toy retrieval more readily than those who relied on observational training.
These findings have been taken to show that action and perception are essentially
coupled and share the same ‘representational space’ (Georgieff and Jeannerod 1998).
Further support for this assumption comes from, the discovery of so-called ‘mirror
mechanisms’ in the brain (Rizzolati and Craighero 2004; Gallese and Sinigaglia 2011),
developmental studies on imitation (Meltzoff 2004, 2006; Meltzoff and Moore 1977,
1994; Meltzoff and Brooks 2001), and considerations about representational formats
(Kovács et al. 2010).
How do agents acquire an understanding of causal2 relations between non-action
events? Woodward (2007) suggests that this requires a full-fledged means/ends under-
standing, and an appreciation of causal relations among variables that are intermediate
between the agent’s action and its effect.
In particular, means/ends understanding seems to involve a decomposition of a
task into an intermediate outcome O that can be produced fairly directly by the
subject’s action A and a further outcome O’ that is more directly caused by O
and less directly by A, and where the link between O and O’ is a tertiary link
between events, rather than an action-event link. (p. 34)
According to Woodward, the postulation of such an intermediate link goes hand
in hand with a decoupling of means from ends and a focus on the latter as a separate
entity. Following Tomasello and Call (1997), he argues that this decoupling is closely
4 The difference between perceiving correlations between external events (stage i) and understanding
causal1 relations between another agent’s actions and their effects (stage ii) resembles the difference between
classical and instrumental conditioning. In classical conditioning, the agent learns about a predictive relation
between two events that are outside of her control, whereas in instrumental conditioning what is learned is
a predictive relation between an action of the agent and its effect. Woodward (2007) argues that, from an
interventionist perspective, instrumental learning has a ‘cause-like’ flavor. Although we agree that instru-
mental learning has this cause-like flavor, we think this is better explained using an agency perspective on
causation.
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linked to learning through imitation, where the behavioral means have to be copied
in such a way as to reproduce the goal of the action, while other features have to be
varied in order to accommodate differences between the target and the imitator.
Although 6-month-olds are already capable of reproducing another agent’s action
on an object (Barr et al. 1996), imitative learning in the sense described above seems
to emerge only after the first year of life. In an experiment by Meltzoff (1988), for
example, 14-month-olds observed an experimenter bend down and activate a rectan-
gular box with his head, causing the box to light up. The infants followed suit even
though they were in the position to turn on the light by simpler means (e.g., with their
hands), which means that they were reproducing the means-end structure of the action,
and not just the goal (see also Gergely et al. 2002; Williamson and Markman 2006).
In this experiment, the link between the intermediate outcome (activating the rec-
tangular box) and the further outcome (turning on the light) is still an action-event link.
However, their increasing flexibility in reasoning about means (i.e. that goals can be
brought about in very different ways) eventually allows infants to understand an inter-
mediate outcome as a non-action event, and hence the link between an intermediate
outcome and a further outcome as a causal2 relation. We are not aware of any empiri-
cal evidence that shows precisely when this happens. As Bonawitz et al. (2010) have
shown, young infants (24 months) still need supplemental information to understand
causal2 relations between non-action events. That is, infants do not spontaneously
intervene on a predictive relation unless the events are initiated by another agent, the
events involve unmediated, direct contact between objects, or adults describe the events
in causal language. However, Bonawitz et al. (2010) found that older infants (from 37
months onwards) do spontaneously intervene without this kind of information.
Many loose ends remain in the outline sketched above. What we hope to have
shown, however, is that there is a plausible empirical story to tell about the acquisition
of an interventionist understanding of causality in the early life of the child, one that
lines up with the two-stage rational reconstruction we presented in Sect. 3. This gives
psychological plausibility to our philosophical theory. In addition, our story seems
to be compatible with Woodward’s own empirical account of interventionism (as
presented in Woodward 2007, 2009), especially since he acknowledges that agency-
based accounts may play an important role in the acquisition of causal knowledge (see
Woodward 2009, p. 259).
5 Conclusion
Woodward’s theory is beset by a problem of circularity. This circularity should be
seen, not as a problem in Woodward’s analysis of the meaning of causation, but as a
problem of genesis: on Woodward’s theory, it is mysterious that we ever manage to
start getting causal knowledge. Interventionism may work very well once we have a
basis of causal knowledge, but it cannot explain how we ever get such a basis.
We have presented a way out of this dilemma by showing how a primitive agency
notion of causation can be used to get the interventionist theory of causation started.
The concept of intervention can be understood as a generalisation of the concept of
agency by which the limitations and problems of the more primitive theory can be
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overcome. At the same time, it (contingently) turns out that the positive causal claims
of the agency theory can almost always be held true on the interventionist theory,
which means that they can be used as a basis for the more advanced theory.
We have also shown that our rational reconstruction of the development from agency
to intervention lines up nicely with empirical research about causal reasoning in chil-
dren. This lends further plausibility to our philosophical theory.
Finally, it should be stressed again that the theory presented here is not a hybrid
agency/interventionist theory. The analysis of causation given by Woodward remains
wholly intact. We have merely sketched a path for the development of this concept of
causation, a development which, because of the circularity of the concept, was mys-
terious. By removing the mystery, we believe to have strengthened the interventionist
position considerably.
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